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REVISITING KANT’S DEDUCTION OF 
TASTE: THE “EASY” SOLUTION TO THE 
PARTICULARITY PROBLEM
R. S. Kemp
inTroducTion
In §38 of the third Critique, Kant provides a deduction that purports to ground the universal validity of aesthetic judgments. If the deduction 
is valid, whenever a person judges an object to be beautiful, they can le-
gitimately expect others to judge the object similarly. The deduction itself 
is remarkably brief and—if Kant’s own evaluation can be trusted—rela-
tively “easy.” Recently, however, some have worried that Kant’s deduction 
may be rather too easy, suggesting that it is not sufficient to prove that 
particular objects must always produce the same response in those who 
encounter them under suitable circumstances.1 In response to this prob-
lem (what has been called the “particularity problem”), it has become 
increasingly popular for commentators to introduce several—on the face 
of it, unrelated—third Critique notions to secure the deduction’s claim.2
 In this essay, my main concern is to provide an interpretation of Kant’s 
§38 deduction that reveals it to be sufficient on its own, that is, valid 
without appeal to any premises not explicitly employed in the deduc-
tion itself. In section 1, I begin by briefly discussing the epistemological 
character of the deduction. Because the deduction licenses normative 
claims concerning what counts as an appropriate judgment, some com-
mentators have thought that the deduction must include premises that 
explicitly connect aesthetic judgments with moral judgments. If this is 
correct, my claim concerning the sufficiency of Kant’s deduction is wrong. 
In section 2, I reformulate the particularity problem in terms that bet-
ter reflect the deduction’s actual goal and offer a final interpretation of 
§38 that maintains that the deduction is not only successful but strik-
ingly straightforward. Finally, in section 3, I consider and defend the 
independent plausibility of Kant’s two central premises.
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1. The norMaTiviTy of judgMenT
According to Kant, a judgment of beauty licenses an agent to expect that 
others “should approve of the object in question and . . . declare it beauti-
ful” (KU, 5:237).3 The explicitly normative force of this conclusion, along 
with Kant’s association of beauty with morality, has led some to think 
that the deduction must culminate in “a transition from the aesthetic 
realm to the realm of morality.” Thus, Donald Crawford writes, “Kant’s 
argument is . . . that the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good, and 
consequently it gives pleasure with a justifiable claim for the agreement 
of everyone” (1974, 68–69). Because this account of what a successful 
deduction requires is incompatible with the interpretation I give later 
in the paper, it is important to clarify the sense in which judgments of 
beauty are normative for Kant.
 In the brief “Remark” appended to §38, Kant compares the norma-
tivity of aesthetic judgment to that of logical judgment. Because the 
demand for universal assent appropriate to a logical judgment clearly 
lacks moral force, this comparison permits us to see the way in which 
the claim appropriate to aesthetic judgment might also be morally 
neutral. For Kant, the claim that someone ought to find the meadow 
beautiful is normative in the same sense that a person ought to apply 
the concept “dog” to the furry, tail-wagging, animal I call Fido. Clearly, 
in the latter case—that of correctly applying the concept “dog”—the 
demand for universal assent is grounded (at least on the Kantian 
picture) in a common capacity to represent objects (that is, some story 
about shared faculties of cognition) and social agreement regarding 
the concept that refers to a given representation. Even if we were to 
concoct some strange moral duty pertaining to the correct use of the 
concept “dog,” there would remain a distinctly epistemological expec-
tation that others agree with us concerning the proper concept to be 
applied to Fido.
 Just as we can talk about an epistemological duty with respect to logi-
cal judgments, the expectation of agreement that accompanies judgments 
of beauty does not necessarily carry any moral force. For this reason, 
we need not assume that Kant’s deduction of taste—as it is presented 
in §38—requires any premises that link the beautiful to the moral. The 
normative force of the deduction’s conclusion, coupled with the fact that 
Kant later explicitly associates natural beauty with morality, does not 
in itself ensure that the universal assent legitimated by aesthetic judg-
ment is specifically moral. This, along with the conspicuous absence of 
any reference to the moral value of beauty in the section that explicitly 
contains the deduction of taste, strongly suggests that the deduction’s 
conclusion is purely epistemological.4
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 Though there is good reason to think that Kant’s deduction was never 
intended to ground a moral prescription, the interpretive enterprise of 
securing the deduction by appeal to additional “moral premises” will re-
main attractive if the deduction fails to stand on its own. For this reason, 
the best argument against such interpretations is to show the deduction’s 
sufficiency. Before offering my account of the deduction, it will be instruc-
tive to revisit briefly what Kant purports to prove. In the final line of the 
deduction, Kant concludes, “[T]he pleasure . . . in the judging of a sensible 
object in general can rightly be expected of everyone,” that is, if someone 
correctly judges an object to be beautiful, he is justified in expecting others 
to affirm the same (KU, 5:290). Thus, Kant’s account of the “particularity 
problem” has little to do with isolating what it is about objects that occa-
sion judgments of beauty. Instead, he is merely interested in grounding 
the claim that a particular experience of beauty can be universalized. If 
the deduction fails, it must fail in precisely this respect.
 Though it seems clear that this is the only way to flesh out the par-
ticularity problem in terms that harmonize with Kant’s more general 
account, Henry Allison claims that the deduction has nothing to do with 
particular judgments at all, that Kant’s intent was merely to show that 
aesthetic judgments are possible by grounding the subjective principle 
of taste.5 There are at least two reasons to think that Allison is mis-
taken about this. First, Allison improperly concludes from the fact that 
one can never be certain that their aesthetic judgment is pure (that is, 
truly disinterested), that the deduction itself is not meant to license 
such judgments. Kant himself, however, never draws this conclusion. 
Second, in the sections leading up to the deduction proper, Kant gives 
several examples of particular aesthetic judgments (poems, flowers, and 
such) (KU 5:281–84). If such individual judgments are not justified by 
the deduction, Kant’s lead-up to the deduction is grossly misleading.
 Given that Kant has little to say about what specifically makes an 
object beautiful, we might wonder whether the deduction can play any 
significant role in cases of aesthetic disagreement. Because Kant’s for-
mulation of the particularity problem seems to leave this issue wholly 
unanswered, I will—at the conclusion of the paper—return to the issue 
of aesthetic disagreement to explain how Kant’s account might make 
headway in such cases.
2. The deducTion
Though the deduction is written in such a way as to obscure the precise 
number and content of the required premises, Kant kindly attaches a 
footnote that confirms the need for just two. Even with this extra hint, 
however, the literature is far from agreement concerning the number of 
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steps employed.6 In light of this, I will begin by justifying my particular 
selection. If I am right about the premises at work in the deduction, the 
deduction’s validity should be apparent. Slightly less obvious, however, 
is the plausibility of the premises themselves. After briefly defending 
my selection of the premises and explaining their role in the deduction, 
I will address what I take to be the more interesting problem of Kant’s 
argument, its independent plausibility.
 The §38 deduction reads as follows:
If it is admitted that in a pure judgment of taste the satisfaction in the 
object is combined with the mere judging of its form, then it is nothing 
other than the subjective purposiveness of that form for the power of 
judgment that we sense as combined with the representation of the 
object in the mind. Now since the power of judgment in regard to the 
formal rules of judging, without any matter (neither sensation nor 
concept), can be directed only to the subjective conditions of the use 
of the power of judgment in general (which is restricted neither to the 
particular kind of sense nor to a particular concept of understanding), 
and thus to that subjective element that one can presuppose in all 
human beings (as requisite for possible cognitions in general), the cor-
respondence of a representation with these conditions of the power of 
judgment must be able to be assumed to be valid for everyone a priori. 
I.e., the pleasure or subjective purposiveness of the representation 
for the relation of the cognitive faculties in the judging of a sensible 
object in general can rightly be expected of everyone (KU, 5:289–90).
 Our first task is to determine the argument’s steps. Though, as al-
ready mentioned, Kant suggests that just two premises are required, 
this recommendation has been largely ignored. Some commentators 
conclude that the most complete version of the deduction occurs much 
earlier in §21, while others have found it necessary to supplement the 
§38 argument with additional premises. Karl Ameriks is a prominent 
example of the former, and Miles Rind the latter. I will briefly consider 
the arguments of each before offering my own reading.
 In his essay “How to Save Kant’s Deduction of Taste,” Ameriks provides 
an analysis of Kant’s §21 argument as “the first thorough . . . presentation 
of a deduction of taste.” He restates the argument as follows:
(1) Cognitive judgments are communicable.
(2) Each cognition has an accompanying subjective state.
(3) If cognitions are communicable, then so are their accompany-
ing subjective states.
(4) These subjective states involve various proportions in the 
activities of our faculties, and there is some such proportion 
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which is “most beneficial” for the relation of imagination and 
understanding.
(5) States with such a proportion are communicable.
(6) They are aesthetic.
(7) Therefore aesthetic judgment is valid. (Ameriks 1982, 295).
The most important thing to note about Ameriks’s reconstruction is 
that it succeeds as a “deduction of aesthetic judgment” only insofar as 
it introduces a notion that appears nowhere in the body of §21, namely, 
the idea of an “aesthetic state.” In reality, §21 seeks to establish some-
thing much more general than the validity of aesthetic judgments: the 
conditions that must be in place for ordinary cognition. Despite, however, 
containing no explicit reference to aesthetic judgment, §21 does refer 
to certain cognitive “feelings” that might easily be interpreted as the 
pleasure that accompanies aesthetic judgment. Kant writes,
But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a different proportion 
depending on the difference of the objects that are given. Nevertheless, 
there must be one in which this inner relationship is optimal for the 
animation of both powers of the mind (the one through the other) with 
respect to cognition (of given objects) in general; and this disposition 
cannot be determined except through the feeling of it. (KU, 5:238–39).
While the discussion leading up to §21 has trained the reader to asso-
ciate talk of “dispositions,” “proportions,” and “feelings” with aesthetic 
judgment, in this passage Kant makes it very clear that he is referring 
to the conditions for “cognition in general,” that even our more ordinary 
judgments depend on a specific relationship between the imagination 
and the understanding that is accompanied by its own feeling. Because 
§21 is concerned with the conditions of ordinary cognition, we should 
not read it—as Ameriks does—as a deduction of taste. Despite this, and 
as I will soon show, §21 does play a crucial role establishing one of the 
deduction’s central premises.7
 Miles Rind belongs to the second class of interpreters: he thinks that 
the success of Kant’s §38 deduction requires more than the two premises 
recommended by Kant. Rind reconstructs the deduction as follows:
(1) In a pure judgment of taste, the pleasure for which we claim 
subjective universal validity is a pleasure in the mere judging 
of the form of the object.
(2) Therefore, it is identical with the purposiveness of the given 
intuition for the subjective formal conditions of judgment.
(3) Cognitions and representations (i.e., at least some of these) 
are universally communicable.
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(4) Therefore, the subjective formal conditions of judgment are 
the same for everyone.
(5) Therefore, the pleasure in a pure judgment of taste is univer-
sally valid (Rind 2002, 24).
 There are two ways we can read Rind’s reconstruction: either as an 
account that makes explicit certain suppressed premises of the deduction 
or as one that adds premises to the argument. Rind seems to think he is 
doing the latter. For instance, he suggests that Kant’s footnote—instead 
of straightforwardly recapitulating the argument from the main text—
introduces a novel premise: “the premise that cognition is universally 
communicable” (2002, 23). What Rind fails to note is that the move from 
premise (3) to (4) has already been argued for in §21, the passage we 
just considered with Ameriks.8 In §21, Kant suggests that the ability to 
communicate a judgment assumes a “common sense,” what Rind lists in 
premise (4) as “the subjective formal conditions of judgment.” So when 
Kant asserts (4) without first explicitly noting (3), he is not mistakenly 
leaving out a necessary premise. To the contrary, premise (3) is tacitly, 
and legitimately, assumed as part of (4).
 This is confirmed in Kant’s footnote when the claim about commu-
nicability is appended—as a kind of afterthought—to the deduction’s 
primary claim about shared cognitive capacities. The relevant section of 
the footnote reads thus: “In all human beings, the subjective conditions 
of this faculty, as far as the relation of the cognitive powers therein set 
into action to a cognition in general is concerned, are the same, which 
must be true, since otherwise human beings could not communicate their 
representations and even cognition itself” (5:290). The last clause of this 
sentence is what Rind focuses on, but—in so doing—fails to note that Kant 
is not introducing new argumentative material. To the contrary, Kant is 
just reminding the reader of what he takes himself to have shown in §21, 
that the experience of communication is sufficient to establish one of the 
deduction’s core premises, namely, that human beings share the same 
cognitive faculties.9
 With this in mind, we can amend Rind’s reconstruction to better 
represent the structure of the deduction as it is actually given by Kant 
in §38. (Starred premises represent my attempt to combine Rind’s 
premises as Kant himself does in the main text of the deduction. [3*is 
a combination of Rind’s [3] and [4].):
(1) In a pure judgment of taste, the pleasure for which we claim 
subjective universal validity is a pleasure in the mere judg-
ing of the form of the object.s__
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(2) Therefore, it is identical with the purposiveness of the given 
intuition for the subjective formal conditions of judgment.
(3*) The cognitive faculties (that is, the subjective formal con-
ditions of judgment) necessary for aesthetic pleasure are 
present in the same way, and function in the same way, in 
all human beings.
(4) Therefore, the pleasure in a pure judgment of taste is uni-
versally valid.
This version of the argument still contains one more premise than Kant 
himself lists because, in the deduction proper, Kant represents (1) and 
(2) as a single premise. Just as Kant thinks that (3*) possesses all of the 
content Rind includes in (3) and (4), Kant combines (1) and (2). Kant has 
previously argued that, because aesthetic judgments are strictly formal 
(Rind’s first premise), they must be grounded in a feeling of aesthetic 
pleasure that is caused by the harmony of the faculties (Rind’s second 
premise). With this argument in the background, Kant condenses (1) 
and (2) into a single premise, allowing him to present the deduction in 
just two steps:
(1*) Aesthetic formalism: A pure judgment of taste is grounded 
in a feeling of aesthetic pleasure caused by the interplay of 
a human being’s cognitive faculties.10
(2*) Sensus communis: The cognitive faculties sufficient to pro-
duce aesthetic pleasure are present in the same way, and 
function in the same way, in all human beings.11
(3*) Conclusion: A pure judgment of taste is valid for all human 
beings.12
Here, we have a reconstruction of the deduction that parallels the sum-
mary Kant offers in his footnote. I quote the note with my own inserted 
brackets to identify the lines relevant for each premise:
 [3* Conclusion] In order to be justified in laying claim to univer-
sal assent for judgments of the aesthetic power of judgment resting 
merely on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to admit: [2* Sensus 
communis] 1) In all human beings, the subjective conditions of this 
faculty, as far as the relation of the cognitive powers in general is 
concerned, are the same . . . [1* Aesthetic formalism]. 2) The judgment 
has taken into consideration solely this relation (hence, the formal 
condition of the power of judgment), and is pure, that is, mixed with 
neither concepts of the object nor with sensations as determining 
grounds (n5:290). __s
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 Given both that the opening line of the footnote is an obvious restate-
ment of the deduction’s conclusion and that Kant claims just two steps 
are needed to establish it, it is surprising that so few commentators 
reconstruct the deduction as such. One possible reason for this is that 
most commentators take this version of the argument to be incomplete 
and, thus (in a spirit of charity), add steps to make it valid. Though I 
have sympathy for the spirit of this maneuver, I am not convinced it is 
necessary. Having given an account of the number and content of the 
premises of the deduction, I will now consider how they work together 
to justify Kant’s conclusion.
 (1*) Aesthetic formalism: The first premise of the deduction is a 
statement of Kant’s aesthetic formalism; it describes the relationship 
between an object and our cognitive faculties that occasions the feel-
ing of aesthetic pleasure. Though much ink has been spilled13 trying to 
discern how exactly this works, it seems clear that, in cases of aesthetic 
judgment, the sensory manifold is given in a way that is particularly well 
suited to our cognitive aims.14 This striking “fit” between the manifold 
and our powers of cognition induces the harmony of the faculties. For 
the purposes of Kant’s deduction, the most important quality of this 
relationship is its disinterestedness.15 Insofar as an object’s ability to 
occasion the free play has nothing to do with any of its isolated material 
traits, aesthetic judgment is purified of any interests that are unique to 
a particular subject. For example, if the sight of Wyoming’s Grand Teton 
occasions the free play of my cognitive faculties (that is, I experience a 
feeling of pure aesthetic pleasure), then this occurs without regard to 
any particular like or dislike I may have for national parks, objects that 
include the word “Grand” in their title, or fond remembrances of hikes 
past. Kant insists that an experience of beauty has nothing to do with 
any perspectival quirks unique to me.16
 (2*) Sensus communis: Though the deduction’s second premise needs 
little explanation (it is a simple hypothesis regarding the nature of 
human cognition), Kant’s assumption that a “common sense” can be 
presupposed in all rational agents is a move that generally has not 
been well received. I will return to address the plausibility of this more 
controversial premise after finishing my exposition of the deduction.
 (3*) Conclusion: Now that we have the two premises in place, we can 
see how they combine to ground the demand for universal assent. If 
(following premise one) an aesthetic judgment is not grounded in any 
eccentricities of a particular agent and (following premise two) we can 
reasonably expect all agents to possess the same cognitive faculties, 
then when an agent encounters an object that triggers an experience of 
aesthetic pleasure, she can legitimately assume that any similarly placed 
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agent will have the same experience. In more concrete terms, when the 
sight of Grand Teton induces the harmony of the faculties, I experience 
a feeling of disinterested pleasure. Because this experience is grounded 
strictly in the formal relationship between an object and my faculties 
of cognition and the faculties of cognition are assumed to be the same 
for all humans, I can legitimately expect that anyone like me (where 
a person “like me” is someone I take myself to be able to communicate 
with) will judge Grand Teton to be beautiful as well. In this (perhaps 
modest) respect, Kant’s deduction answers the particularity problem, 
securing as it does the universal scope of a particular agent’s judgment 
of taste.
3: The role of sensus Communis
Now that we have the argument, we can revisit some concerns that grow 
out of Kant’s second premise, his claim about a “common sense.” The first 
worry concerns the legitimacy of the premise itself: whether we can (as 
Kant seems to think) simply presuppose that other humans possess “the 
subjective element” requisite for aesthetic judgment (5:290). Because 
the second premise plays such a vital role in the deduction, we should 
expect an account of how such presuppositions are justified, something 
that is not present in §38. A second worry arises when we take seriously 
Kant’s passing suggestion that the conditions for aesthetic judgment can 
be presumed to be ubiquitous because they form the ground of cognition 
in general. Far from justifying the presuppositions of premise two, com-
mentators have worried that grounding cognition in aesthetic judgment 
saddles Kant with the unacceptable conclusion that every object—in 
virtue of being cognized—is experienced as beautiful.
 To justify the second premise, Kant needs us to accept just two ideas: 
that we are beings capable of both 1) cognition and 2) communication. 
From here, Kant can craft an argument that grounds the second premise 
of the deduction. Combining elements from §38 and Kant’s treatment 
of the sensus communis (§§20–22) we can reconstruct the following 
argument (which I will artlessly call “the argument for Kant’s second 
premise”):
(1) We are capable of cognition.
(2) Cognition requires a specific set of properly functioning cogni-
tive faculties.
(3) The cognitive faculties sufficient for cognition in general are 
also sufficient for aesthetic judgment.17
(4) We take it that we can communicate with others. __s
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(5) Taking ourselves to be capable of communication requires that 
we presuppose that those we communicate with cognize in the 
same manner as ourselves.18
(6) From 4 and 5, we must presuppose that those we communi-
cate with have the same cognitive faculties as ourselves.
(7) We must presuppose that those we communicate with pos-
sess the faculties of cognition sufficient for aesthetic judgment 
(that is, there is a sensus communis).
 Temporarily granting premise three, premise five seems to be the 
only premise requiring significant justification. The first thing we should 
notice about the fifth premise is that it is concerned only with how we 
must view those we communicate with, not their actual nature. Because 
Kant needs only to justify certain presuppositions that ground commu-
nication, he does not need to show that other people actually cognize 
in one way as opposed to another. Failing to grasp this distinction has 
led some commentators to hold an unrealistically high bar for Kant’s 
argument, requiring that he both prove the existence and character of 
other minds. Paul Guyer, for instance, writes,
But it is far from obvious that different observers must have simi-
lar faculties in similar dispositions in order to be capable of shared 
knowledge. . . . At the least, it seems that the premise that the commu-
nicability of knowledge entails an identity in the subjective conditions 
or dispositions on which knowledge is based must be proved rather 
than just assumed.19
Compare this to Kant’s more modest claim in §21: “[B]ut since the univer-
sal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense, the latter 
must be able to be assumed with good reason and indeed without appeal 
to psychological observations.” In §22 Kant adds, “This indeterminate 
norm of a common sense is really presupposed by us: our presumption in 
making judgments of taste proves that” (5:239; my emphasis). So, against 
Guyer, all Kant needs to show is that communication presupposes that 
we take others to cognize, and thus see the world, in a similar way. This 
is not something that Kant posits ad hoc. To the contrary, Kant thinks 
it is a transcendental condition of communication itself; any time we 
communicate with someone, we make certain basic assumptions about 
their ability to represent objects and make judgments.20
 Can Kant legitimately assert even this weaker claim? I think so. If 
(following a certain Wittgensteinian line of thought) communication 
requires a shared view of the world (a form of life), and (following a 
certain Kantian line of thought) we think that the manner in which 
we cognize has an important role in shaping that view, it seems like we 
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must project a similar cognitive constitution on those we communicate 
with.21 The basic mental characteristics that we presumptuously extend 
to our neighbors (particularly the sensations that accompany cognitive 
dispositions like judgments of knowledge and beauty) comprise what 
Kant calls the sensus communis, a regulative norm that underwrites 
our aesthetic judgments by presupposing cognitive likeness in those we 
communicate with. These presuppositions regarding the mental con-
stitution of others are not justified insofar as they accurately describe 
the world as it exists outside our own mind (though they may, in fact, 
do this), but rather because the basic practices they underwrite require 
them. We simply could not conduct the everyday business of rational 
agency without them. So while Guyer may be right in suggesting that 
Kant has not shown that all agents are actually similar enough to ground 
the claims of the deduction, Kant does not need to prove this.
 Though I think these considerations help motivate the role of com-
municability in Kant’s larger argument, it is possible that this account 
may do too much work. Consider the following objection. Presumably we 
can also communicate judgments about what is agreeable, for instance, 
that, “This chocolate cake is delicious.” If communication presumes, as 
I suggest above, that those I communicate with are similarly consti-
tuted, why am I not also permitted to judge that they ought to like the 
cake? In other words, does Kant’s “communicability” thesis explain the 
normativity of aesthetic judgment at the expense of explaining, rather 
implausibly, the normativity of judgments about the agreeable?
 In response, Kant would need to argue that the presumption of 
cognitive similarity holds with respect to features that are relevant in 
judgments of beauty and not with respect to judgments of the agree-
able. Since Kant thinks that judgments of beauty exclude reference to 
an object’s sensible content (for example, its color, tone, taste, and so 
forth) in favor of its form (shape, arrangement, form, and such), the 
relevant norms of communication would require that agents expect 
similarity with respect to only those cognitive features responsible for 
representing an object’s formal characteristics. In Kant’s defense, it 
seems plausible that shared cognition of an object’s formal features is 
central to communication in a way that shared cognition of a thing’s 
sensible qualities is not.22 For instance, while I can straightforwardly 
imagine communicating with someone who does not share whatever it 
is about my cognitive makeup that causes me to perceive cake as sweet, 
it is more difficult to make sense of what it would mean to communicate 
with someone who lacked the ability to cognize the cake as an object 
with a particular shape. If this is right, then it makes sense to think 
that communication presumes limited similarity: I must take other 
agents to be like me with respect to their ability to cognize an object’s 
__s
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formal features. Unsurprisingly, these are precisely the features that 
Kant takes to be at issue in cases of aesthetic judgment.
 Having defended the plausibility of premise five, we can turn to 
premise three (the cognitive conditions sufficient for cognition are also 
sufficient for aesthetic judgment), the premise that has led some to as-
sume mistakenly that Kant is committed to the idea that every cognized 
object must also be experienced as beautiful. The line from which I have 
taken the second premise of the deduction reads as follows: “and thus 
to that subjective element that one can presuppose in all human beings 
(as requisite for possible cognitions in general).” (KU, 5:290). There are 
two ways to interpret this passage, one that leads to the traditional and 
problematic conclusion that all cognized objects are also experienced as 
beautiful and a second that merely concludes that the cognitive facul-
ties sufficient for cognition are also sufficient for aesthetic judgment. 
Because the second reading is the third premise of my “argument for 
Kant’s second premise,” it will be helpful to say a word about why we 
should think it is the right way to read the passage in dispute.
 In Kant’s §21 discussion of the sensus communis, we learn that there 
is a particular proportion of fit (what Kant calls a cognitive disposition) 
that a given object possesses with respect to the imagination and un-
derstanding. We also learn that a cognitive disposition is accompanied 
by a distinctive sensation, a feeling that signals to the agent the precise 
character of her judgment. Just as there is a distinctive feeling that 
accompanies a judgment of knowledge, there is a distinctive feeling 
that accompanies a judgment of taste.23 In the deduction, when Kant 
refers to a “subjective element” that can be presupposed for all, he is 
not referring to any specific disposition (for example, the sensation 
that grounds an aesthetic judgment). The subjective element refers to 
the more general phenomenon that accompanies any judgment at all. 
Though, of course, there are specific subjective conditions indicative 
of aesthetic judgments (that is, aesthetic pleasure), Kant is here only 
asking us to presuppose the necessary conditions for judging in gen-
eral, the presence of certain properly functioning cognitive faculties. 
If people possess these general faculties, then they also possess the 
subjective element required for the more specific process of aesthetic 
judgment. So, to put it a bit more succinctly, aesthetic judgments do not 
serve (as some have mistakenly supposed) as the ground for cognition 
in general. Kant is putting forward the considerably less problematic 
thesis that the cognitive mechanisms required for aesthetic judgment 
are also required for cognition in general. If an agent has the faculties 
required for the latter (which we take it she does: see above), she also 
has the faculties required for the former.s__
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 If I am right in thinking that Kant does not take the subjective con-
ditions peculiar to aesthetic judgment to ground cognition in general, 
I need to make sense of passages like the following from the introduc-
tion:
To be sure, we no longer detect any noticeable pleasure in the com-
prehensibility of nature and the unity of its division into genera 
and species, by means of which alone empirical concepts are pos-
sible through which we cognize it in its particular laws; but it must 
certainly have been there in its time, and only because the most 
common experience would not be possible without it has it gradu-
ally become mixed up with mere cognition and is no longer specially 
noticed (KU, 5:188).
Though, on its face, this passage appears to challenge my interpreta-
tion directly, it should be noted that nowhere in §VI does Kant mention 
aesthetic pleasure in particular. Kant does, however, tell us that the 
“attainment of every aim is combined with the feeling of pleasure” (KU, 
5:187). Insofar as cognition in general can be appropriately described 
as an attainment of an aim (namely, finding a dispositional balance 
between the imagination and understanding), it is unsurprising that 
pleasure would accompany it as well. So while all judgments may be 
accompanied by a “feeling” that is engendered by a certain purposive 
relationship between the faculties, it is not obviously the case that Kant 
takes the feeling associated with ordinary cognition to be phenomeno-
logically identical to the feeling of aesthetic pleasure. Thus, even if we 
assume that ordinary cognition involves a judgment of purposiveness, 
we have yet to show that such a judgment is indistinguishable from a 
judgment of purposiveness in a uniquely aesthetic context.
 But perhaps this does not settle things. We can easily imagine 
someone willing to grant Kant’s claim about common faculties while 
still wondering why there is good reason to think that those shared 
faculties function in exactly the same way. Presumably, Kant’s answer 
involves referencing the necessary conditions for basic cognition. In 
the same way that he thinks the understanding applies the categories 
with strict necessity, Kant is committed to the idea that there cannot 
be any variability in the way the imagination and understanding co-
operate to cognize the formal features of an object, that is, the features 
pertinent in aesthetic evaluation. Without this kind of constancy, an 
agent cannot have experiences of any kind. Importantly (and I address 
this above), this does not mean that there is no room for cognitive 
idiosyncrasy. It just means that idiosyncrasy enters into the picture 
at the level of sensation, that is, the qualities pertinent in judgments 
about the agreeable. __s
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 Up to this point in the paper, I have attempted to motivate the claim 
that Kant’s deduction is—as he himself suggests—straightforwardly 
valid and plausibly sound. Furthermore, insofar as the conclusion of 
the deduction justifies an agent’s expectation that all agents will agree 
with his particular judgment, Kant satisfactorily answers the only par-
ticularity problem we can appropriately ask of his account. In spite of 
this, however, one might still wonder whether answering this specific 
formulation of the particularity problem is at all noteworthy. After all, 
the motivation to present a content interpretation (for example, Chignell 
and Savile) is grounded in a pressing need to say something substantive 
about what it is that makes an object aesthetically pleasing. Because 
my interpretation of what can and cannot be legitimately attributed to 
Kant appears to restrict Kant’s ability to offer help in cases of aesthetic 
disagreement, I will close with a few words about the virtues and limita-
tions of Kantian art criticism.
conclusion: reTurning To The ParTiculariTy ProbleM
One might wonder why Kant’s deduction merely grounds our ability to 
expect agreement instead of ensuring that agreement, in fact, occurs. 
If, as Kant suggests, judgments of beauty are grounded in a disinter-
ested encounter with the manifold, beauty should, it seems, always be 
experienced equally. Kant’s answer to why this stronger claim cannot 
be inferred relates directly to how his account handles the problem of 
aesthetic disagreement. Though it is always true that an object that 
occasions a pure aesthetic judgment in one person can and should oc-
casion the same response in another, in practice this does not always 
occur. Because the free play of the faculties is grounded in disinterest-
edness, it may happen that a particular subject’s “overinterest” in an 
object undermines the free play of the faculties. Instead of allowing the 
Taj Mahal to show itself qua Taj Mahal, it may be that a recent foray 
into Kafka has made it difficult to see castle-like structures without 
emotional duress.24
 If I am right about why it is that some people fail to experience 
beauty where others do, an interesting solution to the problem of 
aesthetic disagreement reveals itself. When I fail to experience a 
particular artwork as beautiful (we will assume one that in optimal 
circumstances I would judge to be beautiful), my inability is linked 
to some kind of overt interestedness I bring to my experience of the 
object. Unlike a content interpretation of beauty where I am told what 
it is about an artwork that makes it beautiful (presumably by an art 
critic) and expected to cultivate a taste for it, Kant’s formal account 
of aesthetic judgment leaves open the possibility that what provokes 
beauty is not subject to the whims of mere cultivation, but rather is 
s__
n__
lc
HPQ 34_2 text.indd   188 6/29/17   11:15 AM
 KANT’S DEDUCTION OF TASTE 189
anchored in a nonconceptual relationship between me and an object. 
On Kant’s account, if I fail to properly experience an object as beau-
tiful, it is because I am overcultivated, that is, my ability to let the 
object speak has been undermined by various associations I bring to 
the experience of the object. Though Kant’s answer to the problem of 
aesthetic disagreement may run counter to our intuitions concerning 
the manner in which aesthetic disagreement is resolved in practice, his 
interpretation is uniquely situated to preserve beauty as something 
more than mere cultivation: judgments of beauty are an exercise in 
individual autonomy. This, along with the fact that Kant provides a 
sufficiently rich and plausible account of how disagreement arises and 
is overcome, suggests that a formal interpretation of beauty might be 
an improvement over more content-centric views.
 One might also worry about the reverse: that particular idiosyncrasies 
can cause a person to judge something as beautiful that is not actually 
beautiful. This issue seems especially problematic since it threatens 
to undermine an agent’s right to demand that others agree with her, 
which is, of course, precisely what the deduction purports to license. 
Consider, for instance, a particularly reflective agent who knows that, 
in any given situation, her experience of aesthetic pleasure may be trig-
gered by something that is, from an aesthetic perspective, accidental. 
Doesn’t this knowledge about potential error undermine an ability to 
make legitimate claims on other people?
 On this issue, it is instructive to compare the aesthetic case to the 
moral case.25 While Kant admits that agents can never really know 
whether their own actions are performed from duty, he still thinks that 
agents can legitimately appraise their own actions, even judge that 
others ought to judge them precisely as they judge themselves. An agent’s 
license to judge in this way is not, it seems, dependent on an ability 
always to judge accurately, but rather the fact that such judgments are 
possible: people can act from respect for the moral law.26 Similarly, our 
judgments about the beautiful, while vulnerable to mistake, are licensed 
because agents have the ability to engage disinterestedly with objects 
in virtue of cognitive abilities that they share with others: people are 
capable of pure aesthetic judgment. While more needs to be said about 
the parallel between the moral and aesthetic cases, I think that it stands 
to offer important help in explaining the justification of aesthetic judg-
ment and Kant’s answer to the particularity problem. The ever-present 
possibility of mistake is not sufficient to defeat normative confidence.27
Wheaton College
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NOTES
1. See, for example, Guyer (1993, 12) and Chignell (2007).
2. Chignell (2007) is a notable attempt to do precisely this. With the hope 
of providing a solution to the particularity problem, Chignell appeals to Kant’s 
account of aesthetic ideas to identify what it is about an object that induces 
a judgment of beauty. Though Chignell is by no means the sole proprietor of 
this view (what we might call an aesthetic ideas account), his interpretation is 
instructive insofar as it claims to overcome certain nagging faults that plague 
its predecessors. See, for instance, Crawford (1974) and Savile (1987).
3. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are from Guyer and Matthews 
(2000). Parenthetical references are to the Akadamie edition, Kants gesammelte 
Schriften.
4. Paul Guyer addresses this concern further in Kant and the Claims of 
Taste. See Guyer (1997, 232–33).
5. See Allison (2001, 177–78).
6. See, for example, Allison (2001, 175); Ameriks (1982, 295–96); Guyer 
(1997, 274–93); and Rind (2002, 24).
7. Though §21 should not be read as an independent argument for the 
validity of aesthetic judgments, its argument for a communal sense is assumed 
in the §38 deduction. Thus, Ameriks is right to think that it plays a necessary 
role in the justification of aesthetic judgments. The primary difference between 
my view and Ameriks’s comes down to §21’s sufficiency. Ameriks thinks §21 
provides a full deduction. I think that, at best, it provides support for one of 
the deduction’s two premises.
8. In other words, Rind’s mistake consists in his misleading suggestion that 
the main text of §38 does not contain all the necessary premises. Against Rind, I 
contend that the §38 footnote is simply a recapitulation of the main text. Rind, on 
the other hand, claims that the footnote adds material that the main text lacks.
9. Later on, I say more about the relationship between the ability to “com-
municate” and the sensus communis.
10. Taken from the following lines of text: “If it is admitted that in a pure 
judgment of taste the satisfaction in the object is combined with the mere 
judging of its form, then it is nothing other than the subjective purposiveness 
of that form for the power of judgment that we sense as combined with the 
representation of the object in the mind” (KU, 5:289–90).
11. Taken from the following lines of text: “Now since the power of judgment 
in regard to the formal rules of judging, without any matter (neither sensation 
nor concept), can be directed only to the subjective conditions of the use of the 
power of judgment in general (which is restricted neither to the particular 
kind of sense nor to a particular concept of understanding), and thus to that 
subjective element that one can presuppose in all human beings (as requisite 
for possible cognitions in general)” (KU, 5:290).
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12. Taken from the following lines of text: “[T]he correspondence of a rep-
resentation with these conditions of the power of judgment must be able to 
be assumed to be valid for everyone a priori. I.e., the pleasure or subjective 
purposiveness of the representation for the relation of the cognitive faculties in 
the judging of a sensible object in general can rightly be expected of everyone” 
(KU, 5:290).
13. For a summary of recent scholarship on the topic of the free play, see 
Guyer (2005). Guyer’s own “metacognitive” interpretation speculates that the 
free play is occasioned by objects that are unified in a way “that goes beyond 
anything required or dictated by satisfaction of the determinate concept or 
concepts on which mere identification of the object depends.” Chignell too ap-
pears to interpret the free play in this way. See Chignell (2007, 416).
14. That the manifold possesses some kind of preconceptual unity or coher-
ence can be gleaned from what Kant says in his General Remark following §22:
[A]lthough in the apprehension of a given object of the senses it is of course 
bound to a determinate form of this object and to this extent has no free play 
(as in invention), nevertheless it is still quite conceivable that the object 
can provide it with a form that contains precisely such a composition of the 
manifold as the imagination would design in harmony with the lawfulness of 
the understanding in general if it were left free by itself. (KU, 5: 241)
15. There are two senses in which Kant’s analysis can be considered 
“formal.” In my analysis, I emphasize the formal relationship between the 
imagination and understanding that gives rise to aesthetic pleasure. It is also 
the case, however, that Kant thinks that the free play of the imagination that 
gives rise to aesthetic pleasure is itself caused by certain formal features of an 
object, for instance, an object’s shape or composition. This sense of “formal” is 
not explicitly addressed in my representation of the deduction because Kant 
thinks the two senses are intimately related. A pure aesthetic experience—
that is, one that is accompanied by the relevant feeling of pleasure—can only 
be triggered by the formal features of an object. This means that the formal 
relationship between the imagination and understanding that is depicted 
in premise (1*) already assumes that the formal features of an object have 
been sufficiently isolated. Why Kant thinks that only the formal features of 
an object can elicit this cognitive response is a separate question. I pick this 
issue up again at the end of the paper when I consider the success of Kant’s 
answer to the particularity problem.
16. Kant’s most detailed discussion of disinterestedness comes in §§1–5. In 
§2 he writes,
It is readily seen that to say that [the palace] is beautiful and to prove I have 
taste what matters is what I make of this representation in myself, not how I 
depend on the existence of the object. Everyone must admit that a judgment 
about beauty in which there is mixed the least interest is very partial and 
not a pure judgment of taste. One must not be in the least biased in favor of 
the existence of the thing, but must be entirely indifferent in this respect in 
order to play the judge in matters of taste. (KU, 5:205)
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17. In §21, Kant speaks of “the subjective condition of cognizing,” that is, 
a particular “disposition” shared by the imagination and understanding that 
permits cognition to occur. Later in §38, he again refers to the “subjective ele-
ment (as requisite for possible cognitions in general).” In the context of §38, 
the “subjective element” is something that (1) we can presuppose all humans 
possess and (2) is required to secure the validity of aesthetic judgment. Though 
I will address each of these claims later in the paper, I will briefly say something 
about (2) in order to motivate the third premise of my argument. That human 
beings possess the “subjective condition of cognizing” is vital for the claim of 
the deduction because aesthetic judgment depends on the same faculties (and 
no others) as cognition in general. Thus, if we can presuppose that all humans 
have the faculties requisite for cognition, then we can also presuppose they 
have the faculties requisite for aesthetic judgment. Again, this quick defense 
will be expanded later in the paper.
18. In §21, Kant writes:
Now since this disposition itself must be capable of being universally com-
municated, hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), 
but since the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common 
sense, the latter must be able to be assumed with good reason, and indeed 
without appeal to psychological observations, but rather as the necessary 
condition of the universal communicability of our cognition.” (KU, 5:239)
19. See Guyer (1997, 261–62).
20. It is important to distinguish this claim from a similar claim made by 
Hannah Ginsborg. While I am suggesting that intersubjectivity (that is, com-
municability) may presume that agents—at least implicitly—take each other to 
cognize in a similar fashion, Ginsborg defends the stronger claim that empirical 
cognition depends on intersubjectivity. See Ginsborg (1990), especially 102–70. 
As far as I can tell, my claim is neutral with respect to Ginsborg’s. Thanks to 
one of my reviewers for pushing me to clarify this.
21. After giving this paper at a recent conference, an audience member 
presented an interesting empirical challenge to Kant’s thesis concerning the 
universality of aesthetic judgment. The gentleman claimed that he—pace Kant—
did not expect most people to agree with his judgment that Mozart’s music is 
beautiful. When asked why he did not expect such agreement, his response 
was telling: he thought that most people were too unsophisticated in taste to 
appreciate it. In other words, his inability to view other people as sufficiently 
similar to himself—to see them as fellow community members—prevented him 
from making a genuine aesthetic judgment (insofar as aesthetic judgments are 
accompanied by a demand for universality). Though, following Kant, presup-
posing similar cognitive faculties in others surely is a necessary condition for 
communication, perhaps it is not sufficient. Genuine communication may also 
presuppose that we take the beliefs and values of others seriously.
22. By “sensible qualities,” I just mean the qualities at stake in judgments 
of agreeableness.s__
n__
lc
HPQ 34_2 text.indd   192 6/29/17   11:15 AM
 KANT’S DEDUCTION OF TASTE 193
23. Kant writes, “Nevertheless, there must be [a disposition] in which this 
inner relationship is optimal for the animation of both powers of the mind . . . 
with respect to cognition . . . in general; and this disposition cannot be deter-
mined except through the feeling [of being in that disposition]” (KU 5:238–39).
24. One might also worry about the reverse: that particular idiosyncrasies 
cause me to judge something as beautiful that is not actually beautiful.
25. While clearly there are differences between the moral and aesthetic 
cases, I do not think those differences undermine the comparison. The key is-
sues at stake in the particularity problem are (i) a concern about the legitimacy 
of aesthetic judgment in light of the possibility of error and (ii) the cognitive 
similarity of rational agents. Even though moral judgments are determinate 
in a way that aesthetic judgments are not, they are still vulnerable to the kind 
of error that threatens the latter.
26. Importantly, this is a judgment about whether one has acted from the 
moral law, not about what the law itself demands.
27. This essay has benefitted from a healthy dose of critical input, both 
in person and anonymously. Special thanks to G. Anthony Bruno and Oliver 
Sensen for encouraging me to see the project through to publication. Thanks 
also to Fred Rush and Thomas Teufel for comments on earlier drafts.
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